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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES: HOW SUPPLIERS COMPENSATE FOR PRICE
CONCESSIONS AND THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL JUSTICE IN BUYERSUPPLIER RELATIONS

This is not the final copyedited version of the manuscript and thus there may be typographical
errors that have yet to be corrected.

ABSTRACT
“You get what you pay for” is one of life’s lessons that predominates in purchasing decisions
individuals make in their personal lives. The results of this study suggest this lesson should also
prevail among management when price-related purchasing decisions in businesses are being made.
An evaluation of over 1,700 purchasing instances across seven years of a longitudinal panel dataset
collected from Tier 1 production suppliers to the six major North American automotive Original
Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs): Chrysler, Ford, General Motors, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota,
found that suppliers compensate for price concessions and price reduction pressure from the OEM
in the year following the concession, by reducing product quality, service support, and R&D
expenditures associated with goods provided to the OEM. This industry is particularly relevant
because it is highly adversarial, yet at the same time reliant on interdependence. The results show
that supplier price concessions granted to an OEM led to compensatory supplier behaviors of
reduced quality and R&D expenditures towards that OEM. Further, the results suggest that the
organizational justice dimensions of distributive justice, procedural justice, interpersonal justice,
and informational justice can ameliorate negative supplier compensatory activities. A buyersupplier relational environment that engenders organizational justice tactics such as open and
honest communication with suppliers, provides suppliers the expectation of an acceptable return
on business over the long-term, provides help to suppliers to reduce costs, and builds supplier trust
of the OEM had generally positive effects on quality, service and R&D expenditures. From a
management perspective these results indicate there is a very real risk vs. reward issue associated
with pressuring suppliers for price reductions.
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INTRODUCTION
A significant amount of research suggests that strong supplier relationships can lead to
positive outcomes. Buyers who maintain good supplier working relations over time generate
positive returns on co-innovation for both buyers and suppliers (Yeniyurt, Henke, & Yalcinkaya,
2014). Despite these benefits, firms often ask their suppliers for price concessions, adding
significant pressure to their relationships. Evidence further suggests that these higher supplier price
concessions/pressure can put collaborative relationships at risk (Henke, Yeniyurt, & Zhang, 2009).
For example, one study has shown that manufacturers who exert price reduction pressures on their
suppliers in an adversarial manner in order to decrease costs, increase margins, and maintain
competitiveness, can cause stress across their mutual working relationships (Henke & Chun,
2010). The potential for this risk is not new, and was recognized over 90 years ago in a 1927 New
York Times article (p. 18, November 27, 1927) that reported a “Large Company Orders Agents to
Stop ‘Hard Buying’”, because ‘Company” executives had come to the realization that “…any
vendor supplying material at a financial loss….is going to exhaust every means of recouping that
loss”. Terpend, Tyler, Krause, and Handfield (2008) substantiated this belief 80 years later when
their review of 151 buyer-supplier relationship articles appearing in four prominent academic
journals between 1986 and 2005 concluded that “…. practitioners can be confident that pursing
appropriate purchasing practices will positively impact the bottom line”. More recently,
Automotive News Europe reported that “Partsmakers blame added price pressure for deteriorating
relations” (Stanley, 2014). Furthermore, from 2000-2012, during years of adversarial supplier
relations under Daimler and Cerberus management, Chrysler proceeded to lose $2 billion annually
(Henke, Stallkamp, & Yeniyurt, 2014).
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This potentially negative impact on working relations is, clearly, no small matter. The
importance of this issue becomes particularly significant when it is realized that buyers, when
pressuring their suppliers for price decreases, concurrently ask the same suppliers to increase
product quality, increase service support, and increase innovation/R&D (e.g., Zhang, Henke, &
Griffith, 2009). Thus, the intersection of reduced revenue (for the supplier) and increased product
quality (for the OEM) renders a potentially tenuous buyer/supplier relationship. Yet, research has
yet to address suppliers’ responses to these perceived inequities in the buyer/supplier relational
dynamic. What becomes critical, then, is to identify the theoretical antecedents/mechanisms by
which such adverse outcomes can be mitigated or eliminated. Scholars have turned to equity theory
as a conceptual framework to understand supplier behaviors under similar conditions. Equity
theory posits that actors will consider the nature and distribution of inputs and outputs in an
exchange, determine whether or not the distribution is equitable, and if it is not equitable determine
how to compensate for the imbalance (Huseman, Hatfield, & Miles, 1987). This theoretical lens
has been used to explain value creation (Wagner, Eggert, & Lindermann, 2010) and to understand
positive vs. negative inequity in buyer-supplier relationships (Coley, Lindermann, & Wagner,
2012).
Presently, the literature on suppliers’ compensatory actions in response to buyer price
pressures is relatively scant. Overwhelmingly, such work focuses on the conditions under which a
supplier would acquiesce and give a price concession (Henke et al., 2009), rather than examining
how a supplier will respond to such pressure in other areas (i.e. what are the unintended
consequences of price pressure). Subsequently, this paper seeks to fill this gap by considering the
following research questions: (1) In the presence of relational inequity(ies), do suppliers
compensate by reducing the quality, service, and R&D activities associated with goods that are
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provided the buyer?; and (2) What is the impact of buyer-supplier working relations on such
compensatory actions?
The study seeks to answer these questions by integrating equity theory, organizational
justice, and buyer-supplier relational dynamics to understand the role working relations have on
how suppliers compensate buyers when faced with relational (i.e., equity) imbalances. In
particular, the paper explores whether suppliers respond to price concessions by decreasing their
performance in other areas. The results show that supplier price concessions granted to an OEM
led to compensatory supplier behaviors of reduced quality and R&D expenditures towards that
OEM. Further, the results suggest that the organizational justice dimensions of distributive justice,
procedural justice, interpersonal justice, and informational justice can ameliorate negative supplier
compensatory activities. A buyer-supplier relational environment that engenders organizational
justice tactics such as open and honest communication with suppliers, provides suppliers the
expectation of an acceptable return on business over the long-term, provides help to suppliers to
reduce costs, and builds supplier trust of the OEM had generally positive effects on quality, service
and R&D expenditures. From a management perspective these results indicate there is a very real
risk vs. reward issue associated with pressuring suppliers for price reductions.
LITERATURE REVIEW: EQUITY THEORY & BUYER SUPPLIER RELATIONSHIPS
Equity Theory
Equity theory, as an academic viewpoint, traces its roots back nearly 60 years to the field
of social psychology. The seminal work in the field (see: Adams, 1963, 1965) began with
exploration into the drivers of workplace dissatisfaction, with respect to pay/compensation, and
how to potentially mitigate the dissatisfaction. Adams (1965) grounded the theory by examining
“(1) the nature of inputs and outcomes, (2) the nature of the social comparison process, (3) the
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conditions leading to equity or inequity and the possible effects of inequity, and (4) the possible
responses one may make to reduce a condition of inequity” (Pritchard, 1969:176). As originally
conceptualized, inputs refer to any factor either endogenous (i.e., appearance, age, etc.) or
exogenous (i.e., level of effort exerted, education, etc.) to the social agent, which taken together
affects how the aggrieved person gains/perceives some personal return. Outcomes refer to returns
the social agent values (pay raises, bonuses, better work schedules, etc.). Taken together, inputs
and outcomes form a perceived value ratio (i.e., inputs/outcomes), which enables the direct
comparison of the relative importance of the outcomes to the inputs.
It is the perception of this “value ratio” that is at the heart of equity theory. Specifically,
the social comparison process occurs between the value ratios of two social agents. When a social
agent comparing their value ratio to another agent’s value ratio perceives their outcome is less than
that of the agent against whom the comparison is being made then there exists an inequity. If the
outcomes are perceived as equal, then equity theory suggests equity exists in the relations between
the two parties. Although equity theory originated as a form of social comparison between social
agents, it has been shown to apply to social comparisons made within a social agent as well. For
example, equity theory has been shown to apply when pay cuts are initiated at an organizationalwide level (Greenberg, 1990a). In this case, though comparisons to other social agents remained
relatively similar, as the pay cuts were equitable at 15% for every employee, the change in
compensation triggered perceptions of inequity, which resulted in higher levels of theft. In buyersupplier relationships, comparisons that trigger equity theory have been identified as both "‘I paid
more than another customer did,’ which is a comparison between two price points, or ‘I paid more
than I used to,’ which is a comparison between a price point and a price range” (Xia, Monroe, &
Cox, 2004:2). Self-comparison serves as a natural extension of equity theory, as the information
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necessary for comparing equity is immediately available when comparing temporal changes to
compensation. Furthermore, prior research suggests that self-comparison has a demonstrable effect
on behavioral changes (Greenberg, 1990a).
The theoretical underpinning of the existence of (in)equity rests upon there being cognitive
dissonance between the expected outcome and its actualization. This dissonance leads to one social
actor feeling as though “things did not go as expected” (Adams, 1963:9). The impact of such
(in)equity has the potential to cause tension in the relations of the social agents (Adams, 1965).
Such tension leads one agent to seek remediation from the other to reduce or eliminate the inequity
(Pritchard, 1969). Social agents can take several avenues to reduce or eliminate perceived
inequities that generally fall into two overarching categories (Adams, 1963, 1965; Pritchard,
1969): internal and external responses. Internally, i.e., psychologically, the social agent can distort
the perception of the inputs and/or outcomes to make the perception of the outcome more palatable.
Such internal actions deal predominantly with the psychological mechanisms and effects the
inequity has on the relationship. Externally, the social agent can change their inputs/outcomes or
act to change the inputs/outcomes of the social agent against which the comparison has been made.
Given the focus of this study is on the impact of external forces, i.e., buyer price reduction pressure
on suppliers, on the working relations between firms, the externally focused supplier responses are
of critical interest.
Scholars investigating supply chain relations and the equitable distribution of rewards
between exchange partners have been a topic of inquiry for some time. The core question of most
of this research relates directly to the impact on the involved firms and their supply chain relations
when levels of (in)equity are (low)high and how the firms/social agents remediate such an
imbalance. At the firm level, and with respect to pricing, equity theory has elucidated the role that
6

pricing plays in customer satisfaction and brand loyalty, finding that inequity has a largely negative
effect on these two constructs (Huppertz, Arenson, & Evans, 1978). Equity theory has also
contributed to understanding the antecedents to customer satisfaction in international buyersupplier relationships, finding that even across borders, inequity can negatively impact relational
dynamics of firms (Homburg, Krohmer, Cannon, & Kiedaisch, 2002). Echoing these findings,
research has also related equity theory to the market orientation of industrial distributors, finding
that the perception of equitable distribution between exchange partners is a significant facilitator
to relational success (Siguaw, Simpson, & Baker, 1998).
Scholars have also studied supplier willingness to collaborate in projects when inequities
are present, finding that under the presence of inequity suppliers become less likely to collaborate,
particularly in short term engagements (Coley et al., 2012). Furthermore, gaps in expectations
inherent in buyer-supplier relationships can lead to lower levels of innovation (DeCampos, 2014).
Additionally, such inequities can create power imbalances, which have been shown to negatively
affect the relationship between parties (Nyaga, Lynch, Marshall, & Ambrose, 2013) and lead to
perceived opportunistic behavior (Villena & Craighead, 2016). Expanding on the above, it has also
been shown that such dependence can significantly affect the relationship between trust and
resource allocation (Pulles, Veldman, Schiele, & Sierksma, 2014), which further amplifies extant
work suggesting that cooperation in such relationships can alleviate cost issues in such exchanges
(Terpend & Krause, 2015).
Organizational Justice
Organizational justice stems from equity theory (Adams, 1963, 1965; Pritchard, 1969), and
explores the role of fairness within organizational relationships (Greenberg, 1990b). While equity
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theory primarily emphasizes the difference between inputs and outputs – which can be exacerbated
when buyers request price concessions from their suppliers – organizational justice emphasizes
the dimensions of fairness within the relationship. Organizational justice originally emphasized
the role of distributive justice, which has the strongest connection to equity theory, and has since
expanded to include other types of justice (Greenberg, 1990b); specifically, four : (1)informational
justice, (2)interpersonal justice, (3)distributive justice, and (4)procedural justice (Colquitt, 2001),
though informational and interpersonal justice are sometimes combined into interactive justice
(Luo, 2007). Interpersonal justice is “the perceived fairness of the interpersonal treatment that is
shown to others when procedures are implemented and outcomes are allocated” (Johnson, Lanaj,
& Barnes, 2014:3). Informational justice primarily refers to the efficacy of communication
surrounding a procedural change (Colquitt, 2001). Distributive justice represents the fairness of
decision outcomes and the distribution of resources (Ololube, 2016). Procedural justice represents
the “perceived fairness of how decisions are made and outcomes are determined” (Johnson et al.,
2014:2). Combined, the different dimensions of justice help to provide numerous perspectives on
how fairness might be perceived in relationships.
Organizational justice has been advanced as an important consideration in supply chain
management. Understanding the role of organizational justice can reduce opportunistic behavior
(Ireland & Webb, 2007) and help recover trust after supply chain disruptions occur (Wang,
Craighead, & Li, 2014). In a critical study, Narasimhan, Narayanan, and Srinivasan (2013) studied
inter-organizational justice in supply chain relations and found that performance increases are
possible through investments that increase the justice realized by the involved parties, but if
investments are made outside of the critical, i.e., constraining, elements of the relationship, the
performance benefits may not be realized. Narasimhan et al. (2013) emphasize that not only are
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the different aspects of justice important, but that emphasis on the constraining factor in a given
relationship can provide additional understanding of the relationship justice has with performance.
Their findings suggest that the constructs of organizational justice should not be viewed only in
isolation, but within the system as a whole.
Given equity theory’s emphasis on the perception of inputs-to-outputs, firms experiencing
an adjustment to their inputs (i.e., price concessions) might commensurately adjust their outputs
(e.g., quality, service, and R&D levels) in order to create a more equitable distribution between
parties. In such a context, organizational justice emphasizes the perception of fairness within the
relationship. Such perceptions can also impact supplier behaviors, particularly because price
concessions serve as a trigger for suppliers to potentially change their behavior by reducing outputs.
Thus, the relational strategies advocated in the framework of organizational justice can help to
mitigate the consequences of unilateral price concessions. We emphasize four buyer-supplier
relationship constructs which, tacitly, are connected to these dimensions of justice and
subsequently use them in the below hypothesis development. Hence, the theoretical model, the
dimensions of organizational justice and the buyer supplier relational constructs are shown in
Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
As implied in the literature review above, equity theory contains two core questions: 1)
what is the effect of inequity in a relationship?; and 2) how will social agents remediate such
inequity a) to their benefit and b) to rebalance the relational dynamics? Extant literature is replete
with research that has implicitly and explicitly studied the negative effects of inequity. Yet, in the
context of buyer-supplier relations, research that deals with how suppliers respond to buyer-
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initiated adversarial price reduction pressure is somewhat scant, in spite of its importance. For
example, it has been found that pressure from the more powerful agent in the supply chain can
lead to particularly negative consequences (Henke et al., 2014). Subsequently, the focus of this
study is buyer-initiated adversarial price reduction pressures on suppliers that create a
demonstrable inequity in the buyer-supplier relationship.
Supplier Compensatory Actions
When such inequity exists, we posit the supplier will seek to rebalance the perceived
relational equity by responding with compensatory actions that might negatively impact the buyer.
The study focuses on three potential non-price related areas of compensatory actions that suppliers
can use to balance such inequity: quality of the goods provided the buyer, services and support
offered to the buyer, and R&D activities associated with the goods supplied to the buyer. We refer
to these compensatory actions as quality, service, and R&D responses. The extent of the action
taken with these actions is measured by a balanced five (5) point scale ranging from decrease to
increase (the Method section, below, describes the scale in more detail) in response to price
concessions given to a buyer.
Several different compensatory behaviors are included in the research as the specific ways
through which a supplier finds an equitable remedy to buyer-initiated price concessions. In order
to accommodate a decrease in the inputs in a firm’s equity equation, we expect that they might
respond by decreasing their outputs in different ways to balance their equity. Perhaps the most
straightforward is that a supplier who is paid less (i.e. acquiesces to a price concession) might
respond by reducing the quality of the product to lower levels (e.g. cheaper materials or fewer
quality controls). It is possible, however, that firms are not willing or able to reduce quality levels
specific to a buyer, which could lead to other compensatory actions. Firms might respond to a

10

decrease in the perceived equity in the relationship by reducing service levels provided to the
buyer. As a buying firm reduces their inputs into the relationship, the supplier can reduce their
outputs in terms of service levels. Higher service levels can be value-adding within the relationship
but also can be costly and perceived as less valuable as they are not direct cost-reductions
(Christopher & Rayals, 2014). Reductions in service levels can compensate for the inequity and
reduce other costs associated with the relationship, thereby acting as a mechanism for reducing the
perceived disparity created by price concessions. Reductions in a firm’s financial slack can
compromise other areas of performance, such as service levels and safety performance (Fawcett,
Jin, Hofer, Waller, & Brazhkin, 2016). Similarly, as the overall slack is reduced when a supplier
agrees to price concessions, this can reduce the supplier’s resources to engage in R&D efforts.
Accordingly, we expect that price concessions might also result in firms seeking remediation
through reductions in their R&D expenditures to accommodate reduced revenue. While a longterm orientation has been shown to lead to firm’s value and operating performance, incentives do
not always align with long-term performance (Flammer & Bansal, 2017). While this might have
implications for long-term innovation which is negative for the supplier as well as the buyer, it
might be necessary for the short-term in highly competitive industries where price concessions are
more common. Accordingly, in the presence of reducing prices from short-term pressures, we
anticipate that supplier might respond by reducing their outputs in terms of R&D expenditures.
Supplier Price Concessions – Equity Theory
Buyer price reduction pressures are applied on suppliers of production goods for two
reasons. First, to increase the probability that the supplier will provide the buyer a price concession
on the current cost of the goods being provided by the supplier. Second, to increase the amount
of the price concession the supplier is otherwise willing to give the buyer. In fact, the greater the
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buyer price reduction pressure, the greater the supplier price concession (Henke et al., 2009). This
buyer price reduction/supplier price concession scenario is a win-lose situation. The buyer wins
because the price concession it receives has a positive impact on its financial state. The supplier
cost concession immediately reduces the buyer’s cost of goods, which directly increases the
buyer’s gross profit the amount of the concession. The supplier loses because any monies the
supplier gives up in the form of a price concession has a negative impact on the supplier’s financial
state; both revenue and profit are reduced by the amount of the concession.
In the context of equity theory, the concession the supplier gives to the buyer results in
relational inequity. This inequity arises as the supplier compares their loss of revenue and the
buyer’s increased margin that resulted from the concession given to the buyer. Such inequity can
cause negative effects on the relationship (Narasimhan et al., 2013; Pulles et al., 2014), which
further reduces the supplier’s willingness to collaborate (Coley et al., 2012) and detracts from the
efficiency and effectiveness of the working relationship between the two parties (Carrell & Dittrich,
1978). Accordingly, equity theory suggests that the supplier will seek to remediate their inequitable
position by rebalancing the scale by seeking some compensatory action, e.g., quality, service, and
R&D response discussed above, to correct the inequity. Therefore, we posit:
H1: Supplier price concessions given to the buyer in the previous year have a negative effect on
the supplier (a) quality, (b) service, and (c) R&D responses provided the buyer in the following
year.
Buyer Communication - Informational Justice
Research that focuses on buyer-supplier relationships has studied the role of open and
honest communication for some time. These studies suggest that communication is an effective
tool to improve the relationship between parties, in addition to being a critical element in sharing
information (Cannon & Perreault Jr., 1999; Paulraj, Lado, & Chen, 2008; Zhang et al., 2009).
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Information sharing, which has a demonstrably positive effect in enhancing interactional justice,
has also been found to be an essential supply chain management capability (Wu, Yeniyurt, Kim,
& Cavusgil, 2006), with positive benefits in the buyer-supplier relational dynamic (Bendoly &
Swink, 2007; Cannon & Perreault Jr., 1999; Paulraj et al., 2008; Shin, Collier, & Wilson, 2000).
Accordingly, we consider buyer communication to be the extent to which the buyer openly and
honestly shares timely and sufficient information with its suppliers (Anderson & Weitz, 1992;
Paulraj et al., 2008).
Communication serves as a critical antecedent through which informational justice, and
thus overall perceptions of equity, are achieved. Communication has positive benefits in increasing
the perception of equity in relationships (Hulland, Nenkov, & Barclay, 2012). Communication
has also been shown to be closely connected to justice and the decrease of opportunistic actions in
buyer-supplier relationships (Huo, Wang, & Tian, 2016). Informational justice, then, leads to
higher levels of relational performance for the buyer-supplier relationship (Liu, Huang, Luo, &
Zhao, 2012). This is consistent with extant research that suggests increased levels of equity in the
relationship can increase the likelihood of future collaborations (Coley et al., 2012). As partners
experience higher levels of communication, informational justice is increased and, as a result,
positive effects to the ongoing buyer-supplier working relationship occur (Henke, Parameswaran,
& Pisharodi, 2008; Henke et al., 2009; Zhang et al., 2009) and the power balance dynamics in the
relationship can be better managed (Nyaga et al., 2013; Terpend & Krause, 2015).
As buyers engage in effective communication with suppliers, negative compensatory
reactions to price concessions will be reduced as they will be less likely to perceive an inequity
within the relationship. Increased levels of the buyer’s communication can also enhance the
supplier’s willingness to engage in buyer-specific investments (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Bendoly
13

& Swink, 2007; Paulraj et al., 2008). Thus, inequity in relational exchanges has been shown to
lead to negative outcomes, causing one actor attempting to remediate their perceived inequity. In
the present research context, such remediation attempts, we posit, arise from supplier driven
compensatory actions. We subsequently suggest, that increased levels of communication can act
as a buffer in this process, and therefore hypothesize that:
H2: Buyer communication with the supplier has a positive effect on the supplier (a) quality, (b)
service, and (c) R&D response provided the buyer.
Supplier’s Trust – Interpersonal Justice
As firms gain positive experience with one another, this collective shared experience leads to trust
in the relationship (Currall & Inkpen, 2002). Such cumulative trust levels lead to a relational
governance mechanism, which makes trust a particularly strong safeguard against unilateral
opportunistic behavior (Fawcett, Fawcett, Watson, & Magnan, 2012).

Extant research has

suggested that mutual trust reflects one party’s belief in the other party’s reliability and integrity
(Morgan & Hunt, 1994), and can begin to form at the price negotiation phase of the relationship
(Huang, Gattiker, & Schwarz, 2008). Alternatively, if unilateral or mutual distrust exists, the
relationship is likely to suffer as the expectation of reciprocity is absent (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt,
& Camerer, 1998). Hence, it is the continued positive working relations between buyer and
supplier that foster mutual trust which can lead to enhanced collaboration and superior outcomes
than if sought alone (Anderson & Narus, 1990; Fawcett, Magnan, & McCarter, 2008; Gundlach &
Cannon, 2010; Joshi & Stump, 1999).
The issue of trust is tightly connected to the concept of justice, with evidence that there is
a reciprocal relationship between justice and trust when viewed as benevolence and integrity
(Colquitt & Rodell, 2011). Accordingly, trust can be highly associated with perceptions of justice
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and reduce perceived inequities if the supplier trusts the buyer in the relationship even when the
buyer is pressuring for price concessions. In addition, the trust between buyers and suppliers is
strongly related to levels of equity in the relationship (Terpend & Krause, 2015). In the context of
outsourcing in the logistics industry, the equity between parties is positively related to bilateral
trust, as well as to the likelihood that improvements to the relationship will be made (Hofer,
Knemeyer, & Murphy, 2012). In the automotive industry, the development of buyer-specific
technologies typically requires substantial supplier investments. Therefore, a supplier’s trust in
the buyer is essential prior to engaging in such co-innovation behavior. Similarly, it is reasonable
to assume that a supplier would only share proprietary technologies with a buyer that has
established reliability and integrity, and therefore the existence of relational equity.
As discussed in the preceding hypothesis development, it has been suggested that selfenforcing safeguards e.g., governance mechanisms such as trust), can result in supernormal
economic outcomes for exchange partners, and are directly affected by the relational equity
between firms. Such returns can arise given that such safeguards are a superior incentive for value
creation initiatives (Dyer & Singh, 1998) such as reduced costs of conducting business and price
reductions. Furthermore, Narayandas and Kalwani (1995) found that suppliers in a trusting longterm relationship do face price pressures from their customer over the duration of the relationship,
but they are able to offset such price reductions by reducing their inventory costs. Such a result is
only achievable when equity is perceived in the relationship, therefore positively affecting the
levels of trust (Hofer et al., 2012) particularly given the importance of price negations and trust
(Huang et al., 2008). Accordingly, we posit that:
H3: Supplier’s trust in the buyer has a positive effect on the supplier (a) quality, (b) service, and
(c) R&D response provided the buyer.
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Supplier Expectation of Long-Term Economic Returns – Distributive Justice
Generally, in price negotiations it is a win/lose scenario, as a gain by one side is always
related to a loss on the other side. Such perceptions of loss in the context of the pricing can, as
noted above, lead to significant inequities in the relationship (Adams, 1963; Carrell & Dittrich,
1978; Pritchard, 1969) thereby causing one party to seek out ways in which to remediate such
disparities. Perceptions of inequitable distribution of economic benefit can lead to situations where
the relationship fails, such as the potential merger of GM/Renault-Nissan which had a potential
cost-savings of over $10 billion, but failed to be established because of the perceived unfairness
of the distributions of benefits (DeCampos, 2014). Yet, such potentially negative outcomes can be
mitigated if the buyer and supplier are working together in a collaborative, "pie expansion" manner,
that results in mutually beneficial strategic outcomes (Jap, 1999). In discussing distributive justice,
Griffith, Harvey, and Lusch (2006) note, “in on-going supply chain relationships exchange
partners are willing to accept short-term imbalances in outcomes given that over the length of the
relationship outcomes should accurately reflect inputs”. Such a scenario can lead the negotiation
to approach a win-win situation. For example, several suppliers to Honda and Toyota informed
our research team that while they are reluctant to give up the opportunity to increase profits, they
are more willing to give both of these OEMs price concessions. They are willing to do so because
their relationships with both Honda and Toyota are fair in expectations. Also, both OEMs
proactively monitor their suppliers’ financial health to ensure that the supplier remains financially
sound (Bode, Hübner, & Wagner, 2014) which further strengthens the equity in the relationship
(Pulles et al., 2014). Finally, and perhaps most importantly, suppliers are willing to give price
concessions because the relationship the suppliers have with Honda and Toyota reassures the
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supplier that as long as they remain reasonably competitive, each OEM will continue to give the
supplier business.
Extant research has echoed these propositions. One such study found that the suppliers of
Honda and Toyota are 10 times more likely to give price concessions than similar suppliers to GM
and Ford (Sherefin, 2005). One reason for this increased likelihood can be found by juxtaposing
the above hypothesis development. That is to say, the relationship between the exchange partners
leads to the supplier’s perception of long-term returns, which significantly increases the likelihood
of the supplier giving price concessions to the buyer. Additionally, several suppliers to Honda and
Toyota communicated to the research team that they are willing to share information about their
product costs with both manufacturers. They do so because both manufacturers are fair in
preserving their suppliers’ profit margins when looking for ways to reduce cost. Taken together it
becomes clear that the combination of these relational characteristics provides an assurance of
financial certainty. Accordingly, we posit:
H4: Supplier belief that they can make an acceptable return on the buyer’s business over the
long term has a positive effect on the supplier (a) quality, (b) service, and (c) R&D response
provided the buyer.
Buyer Cost Reduction Help – Procedural Justice
While buyers can let suppliers go at it alone in trying to meet their price reduction expectations, a
much more collaborative approach is for the buyer to proactively work with the supplier to
eliminate costs from the transaction, wherever they may be. As an example, Honda works with its
suppliers collaboratively by mandating its engineers to spend extended periods of time at its
suppliers' facilities. In so doing Honda has been able to reduce its suppliers’ costs by as much as
7%, of which approximately 50% is shared with Honda (Liker & Choi, 2004). Toyota uses both
approaches to supplier cost reduction (Liker, 2004; Liker & Choi, 2004). This is also in-line with
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Emerson’s balancing mechanisms (Emerson, 1962), in that one potential avenue for reconciling
differences in power asymmetries is for the suppliers to identify means to increase their efficiency
and reduce their own costs. Much like Honda, Toyota sends its engineers out to suppliers to help
find cost saving opportunities, which eventually translate into lower prices for Toyota. In addition,
Toyota helps suppliers set up groups of non-competing suppliers, sometimes with a Toyota
engineer and other times just with the suppliers, to work together to help each member of the group
find ways to cut costs in its manufacturing facilities. Perceptions of procedural justice, which can
be viewed as the “fairness of that process, associated with the distribution and/or allocation of
goods/services” (Griffith et al., 2006:86) can lead to more positive long term orientation and
relational behaviors. Such procedural justice is reflected by the OEM’s willingness to allocate
resources towards the cost reduction initiatives that they are requesting. When the OEM shares
resources to make the process of price reduction more possible, then the perceptions of fairness
can reduce the inequity perceived by the supplier.
The result of such initiatives is a win-win scenario for both Honda & Toyota and their
suppliers. Increased relational investments such as these lead to higher levels of trust, equity and
overall fairness (Petersen, Handfield, Lawson, & Cousins, 2008). Accordingly, when such
positive relational dynamics are present, we suggest, the supplier is less likely to react to the OEM
with compensatory actions. Thus, we hypothesize:
H5: Buyer help provided to the supplier to reduce costs has a positive effect on supplier (a)
quality, (b) service, and (c) R&D response provided the buyer.
The theoretical framework and hypotheses are depicted in Figure 2.
EMPIRICAL STUDY
Dataset
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The theoretical model, and corresponding hypotheses above, were tested using a longitudinal panel
dataset gathered via an annual survey of Tier 1 production suppliers to the six major North
American automotive Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs): Chrysler/FCA US, Ford,
General Motors, Honda, Nissan, and Toyota. The purpose of the survey is to determine the state
of the working relations that exist between the buyers (i.e., OEMs) and their Tier 1 production
suppliers. Respondents of the survey are the Tier 1 suppliers’ sales personnel (i.e. VP of Sales,
Division Manager in Charge of Sales, Account Representatives) who have overall commercial
responsibility for their firm’s goods supplied to a specific OEM, and are uniquely qualified to
respond to the survey. Over the period of 2003-2009, the data were collected via a survey where
participants are contacted by mail. There were no incentives offered for participation and four
weekly postcards were sent as periodic reminders to complete the survey.
These sales personnel are very much aware of the various interfacing activities that exist
between the supplier and its OEM customers, and thus provide a suitable frame from which to
sample. Furthermore, this approach is consistent with the recommendation to use key informants
who are the most qualified to report on the issues under investigation (Kumar, Stern, & Anderson,
1993). The automotive industry is of particular interest for buyer-supplier price pressures because
it tends to be strongly adversarial, yet also rely on a high degree of interdependence (Gulati &
Sytch, 2007). Time series panel data, were derived for this study. While numerous reasons have
been suggested concerning the challenges of implementing longitudinal field-survey research
(Anderson, 1995), time series panel data offers several benefits, including increased heterogeneity
of observations thereby helping to alleviate multicollinearity concerns, and also allows for the
study of dynamic phenomena (Wooldridge, 2002).
Empirical Model
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In this study, the primary unit of analysis is the matched buyer/supplier relationship, as the
responses are solicited from matched buyer/supplier relationships, over time (i.e. same buyer, same
supplier and captured in the same category area). The data set contains 1733, 1732, and 1734
usable year-supplier-buyer observations across seven years (after lagging the dependent variables
and dropping the observations that have missing information in any of the variables) for the Quality
Response, Service Response, and R&D Response, respectively.
The model chosen to estimate the relationships between organizational justice and price
concessions given is one where the supplier’s responses on quality, service and R&D are modeled
as linear functions of each of the independent variables. Thus, the three models estimated are:

(1) Quality Responseijt = β10 + β11 Price Concession Prev. Yearijt + β12Communication
+ β13Supplier Trustijt + β14 Long Term Returnijt + β15 Buyer Cost Red. Helpijt + β1m X ijt
+ β1n Yijt + ε ijt
( 2 ) Service Responseijt = β 20 + β 21 Price Concession Prev. Yearijt + β 22Communication
+ β 23Supplier Trustijt + β 24 Long Term Returnijt + β 25 Buyer Cost Red. Helpijt + β 2m X ijt
+ β 2n Yijt + ε ijt
( 3) R & D Responseijt = β30 + β31 Price Concession Prev. Yearijt + β32Communication
+ β33Supplier Trustijt + β34 Long Term Returnijt + β35 Buyer Cost Red. Helpijt + β3m X ijt
+ β3n Yijt + ε ijt
where m=6,7,...,10 and n=11,12,...25

where i denotes the supplier, j denotes the OEM and t represents the year under observation (all
other terms are explained, with operationalizations, below). In addition, each βop (where o indicates
from which equation the β has been estimated, and p indicating the chronological ordering of the
β) represents the coefficient corresponding to the independent variable, the !"#$ and %"#$ are
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vectors of control variables (specific details are below in the corresponding section) and the ε’s
represent each equation’s error term. The models are then estimated separately, each of which with
an ordinary least squares approach.
Dependent Variables. The model includes three dependent variables. These are: (1) Quality
Responseijt which denotes supplier i's likelihood to engage in compensatory behavior with respect
to the product quality, with OEM j in year t, based on the price concession behavior of the OEM.
(2) Service Responseijt stands for supplier i's likelihood to engage in compensatory behavior with
respect to the services and support thereof, with OEM j in year t, based on the price concession
behavior of the OEM. Finally, (3)R&D Responseijt stands for supplier i's likelihood to engage in
compensatory behavior with respect to the product quality, with OEM j in year t, based on the
price concession behavior of the OEM. A five-point scale is used to capture each of the
compensatory actions, labeled as “decrease”, “somewhat decrease”, “maintain about the same”,
“somewhat increase”, and “increase.”
Independent Variables. In order to properly test the hypotheses presented above, the following
independent variables are included in the model. First, in order to test H1 the variable Price
Concession Prev. Yearijt is used, and denotes the price concession given by supplier i, captured in
survey year t, and given to OEM j in the previous calendar year (i.e. in the survey year t the value
represents the price concession in year t-1). In order to test H2-5 Communicationijt, Supplier Trustijt,
Long Term Returnijt, and Buyer Cost Reduction Helpijt are the working relations specific variables
that capture the extent of OEM open communication with a supplier, the level of supplier trust in
the OEM, a supplier’s anticipated acceptable long-term returns on the OEM’s business, and the
help received from the OEM regarding cost reduction, for OEM j and supplier i in year t.
Communication, supplier trust, acceptable long-term returns, and buyer cost reduction help have
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been measured using survey questions where the supplier is asked to rate each relationship
characteristic at the time of the survey, on a five point scale, ranging from “to very little or no
extent” and “to a very great extent”. While we note that single item measures are sometimes a
limitation, the current database is uniquely suited for testing the hypotheses presented above given
its longitudinal, time series information on a large panel of supplier/OEM relations. Additionally,
similar studies have utilized single item measures to capture time varying phenomena and estimate
dynamic models (e.g., Henke et al., 2009).
Control Variables. So as to alleviate concerns of omitted variable bias, and to ensure that the
model is as fully specified as possible, we also include several control variables that previous
research has shown to be relevant in a price concession scenario. First, in each of the equations
there is an !"#$ term. Contained in this term are five variables: (1) to capture the experiential effects
that can exist between buyers and suppliers, we include the length of the relationship between the
buyer and the supplier, measured in years; (2) then, in order to capture the dynamics of the working
relationships between the buyer and the supplier, we include the supplier’s involvement in the
OEM’s new product development process; (3) we then include a measure of the general price
pressure that the OEM exerts on the supplier. The next two variables in this vector serve to capture
the power and size of the firms involved in the transaction, both of which also are lagged to account
for endogeneity and auto-correlation. Thus, (4) we include the percentage of the supplier’s revenue
that the OEM is responsible for; and finally, (5) we include the supplier’s size, measured using the
supplier total North American OEM automotive revenues. Taken together, each of these variables
provide for a reasonable control for both the potential power that the OEM can exert over the
supplier, as well as the potential power of the supplier to retaliate. Then, each equation also
includes a %"#$ term, which represents a vector of dummy variables that account for component
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type, OEM, and year. Five-year dummies were included as data from 2003 were used as lagged
variable values (thus, should the model have included a dummy variable for this year there would
have been perfect multicollinearity and it would have been omitted from the model estimation,
hence the use of five), and year 2004 is the base case. Such yearly dummies are critical, as they
control for any year-to-year changes in the economic conditions, and general industry factors such
as raw material supply, customer demand, or commodity prices. Given that there are six OEMs,
five dummies are used to control for OEM specific fixed effects. There are also five dummy
variables accounting for six component types: (1) powertrain (base case), (2) chassis, (3) exterior,
(4) interior, (5) electrical & electronics, and (6) body-in-white. All of the above controls have been
shown to be key explanatory variables in similar research (Henke et al., 2009). A visual
representation of the empirical model can be seen in Figure 2. The descriptive statistics and
correlations can be seen in Table 1.
Insert Figure 2 and Table 1 about here
Results
Ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors was used to estimate each equation above.
The OLS estimates of the equation parameters can be seen in Table 2. The models fit the data
satisfactorily. For the model with Quality Response as the dependent variable the F-statistic with
degrees of freedom (25, 1707) is 6.34 and statistically significant (p<.001); the model with Service
Response as the dependent variable has an F-statistic of 19.93 with degrees of freedom (25, 1706)
which is statistically significant (p<.001); finally, the model with R&D Response has an F-statistic
of 29.25 with degrees of freedom (25, 1708) and is statistically significant (p<.001). Additionally,
the models resulted in R2 statistics of .1036, .2480, and .2993, for Quality, Service, and R&D
responses, respectively.
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Insert Table 2 here
The results indicate that the supplier price concession in the previous year has a statistically
significant (p <.05) negative effect on the quality. Though, while still negative, there is not a
statistically significant effect on the service response from the supplier (p<.101). We do, however,
show support for the negative effect of price concessions on the supplier’s R&D response, where
we see a negative and statistically significant (p<.05) coefficient. Thus, the results indicate strong
support for hypothesis 1a and hypothesis 1c, but fail to support hypothesis 1b. Three things are
worth noting, however. First, across all three coefficients for the price reduction given last year
the effect is negative. Second, that the support was nearly marginally statistically significant for
the effect on Service Response (p<.101). Finally, in 2/3 models, the control variable price
reduction pressure has a coefficient which is negative and statistically significant (p<.05). These
results indicate that as the supplier price concession increases, suppliers tend to decrease the
product quality provided, and also decrease their willingness to invest in R&D with the OEM that
requested the price discount.
OEM communication has a positive and statistically non-significant effect (p>.1) on the
supplier product quality response. Yet, there is a positive and statistically significant effect on the
supplier service, and R&D response (p<.05 for both). These results fail to provide support for
hypothesis 2a but provide support for hypothesis 2b and 2c. Similarly, supplier trust of the OEM
has a positive and statistically non-significant effect on supplier product quality response (p<.105).
However, the effects were positive and statistically significant for supplier service response and
supplier R&D response (p<.05 for both). Thus, the results fail to support hypothesis 3a but provide
support for hypotheses 3b and 3c. As such, the results indicate that supplier trust and OEM
communication do not provide a significant benefit with respect to negative quality responses to
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supplier price concessions, but provide some benefits by limiting the decreases in supplier service
and supplier R&D investments in reaction to supplier price concession.
Supplier’s assessment of potential long-term returns from their relationship with the OEM
has a significant and positive effect on all three types of supplier compensatory actions (p < .001).
Thus, the results provide strong support for hypotheses 4a, 4b, and 4c. Similarly, buyer cost
reduction help has a positive statistically significant effect on supplier product quality (p<.001),
service (p<.05), and R&D response (p<.001). These results provide strong support for hypotheses
5a, 5b, and 5c. Therefore, it can be concluded that both supplier perceived opportunity for longterm returns and buyer cost reduction help are effective mechanisms in limiting supplier negative
compensatory reactions associated with supplier price concessions.
Robustness Testing. In addition, to ensure that our empirical specifications and estimation
techniques were rigorous, several robustness exercises were undertaken. First, in order to control
for any potential heteroskedasticity, all models were estimated with the Huber/White Sandwich
estimators (Freedman, 2006). Second, because the dependent variables were measured on a Likert
scale from 1-5, each model was also estimated using an ordered logistic regression (Winship &
Mare, 1984). We note that in all three cases the coefficients’ effect sizes, directions, and
corresponding statistical significances remain the same. Additionally, given the potential
interrelatedness of the three dependent variables at hand, the model specifications above were also
jointly estimated using a Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) approach (Zellner, 1962). We
note that the coefficients’ directions, effect sizes, and statistical significance remains largely
unchanged from the results obtained by using OLS, as presented herein. We thus conclude that the
econometric approach taken was appropriate to test the hypotheses in this study.
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DISCUSSION
“You get what you pay for” is one of life’s lessons that predominates in purchasing decisions we
make in our personal life. The results of this study suggest this lesson should also prevail among
management when price-related purchasing decisions in business are being made. Given the
persistent pressure OEM’s place on their suppliers for price reductions, it is important to
understand the impact that such price pressure will have on a supplier’s output, in areas aside from
cost. Additionally, an understanding of the factors that can reduce the unintended, and negative,
impacts of such price pressure on supplier output is critical.
The intense competition facing virtually every company requires constant vigilance in
producing the most cost-effective products and services. For those companies in industries that
spend significant portions of their revenue on suppliers, such as in the automotive, airframe, and
aircraft engines industries, the vigilance requires that suppliers be constantly pressured for lower
prices. Such pressures, though, can risk good supplier relationships which can have largely positive
effects on the performance in the relationship (Henke et al., 2009; Yeniyurt et al., 2014). The
results of this study indicate that when suppliers succumb to buyer price reduction pressures the
suppliers concurrently compensate for their loss of revenue and profit by reducing the quality of
the goods and the support provided to the buyer. In addition, the supplier reduces research and
development expenditures associated with the goods provided to the buyer. Although the buyer
receives immediate benefit in the terms of price concessions granted by the supplier, the decrease
in R&D investment/commitment, and the quality of the products can lead to long-term
consequences, which may outweigh the initial savings.
A unique relationship emerges from the results with regard to the price pressure of the
OEM, where the negative and significant relationships between price reduction pressures mirrored
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those associated with the supplier price concession given. That is, the relationship between price
reduction pressure relating to Service and on R&D were both negative and statistically significant
(p<.05), while the relationship between supplier price concession given was negative and
statistically significant with the supplier’s quality and R&D responses (p<.05). It is possible that
higher levels of pressure in the relationship led to decreases in more long-term relational
investment, while price concessions given led to decreases in quality, which is more reflective of
an immediate equity adjustment associated specifically with the decrease in price. From a
management perspective these results suggest that there is a very real risk vs. reward issue
associated with the pressuring suppliers for price reductions. The reality of the marketplace,
however, does not make letting up on the price reduction pressure a viable option. So, what is the
buyer to do?
The results indicate that there are several concomitant activities that purchasing
management can undertake to ameliorate the supplier negative compensatory actions. Purchasing
management can ensure that purchasing agents working with suppliers provide the information
and data supplier personnel need to meet the needs of the company in a timely and adequate, open
and honest manner. Such communication, the results indicate, will help instill a willingness in the
supplier to increase service and support, and continue conducting R&D research associated with
the product provided the company. Such communication will also contribute to the supplier being
more trusting of the company, which in turn, as the study has substantiated, will further reinforce
supplier willingness to increase service and R&D activities.
While increased and improved communication will help maintain the service and R&D
activities it will not change the supplier’s compensatory action of reducing product quality. This
is understandable since supplier personnel associated with services and support, and R&D
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activities are a sunk cost. So, having these personnel continue to work on activities associated
with the buyer who has just been given a price concession does not cause the supplier to necessarily
incur additional costs. On the other hand, the cost of maintaining the product quality will
exacerbate the supplier’s lower revenues and loss profits resulting from the price concession.
Accordingly, the buyer needs to do something that helps the supplier to overcome the
revenue and profit losses. In fact, the study results provide specific direction as to how this can be
done. First, the buyer can work with the supplier to find ways to reduce the costs associated with
the provided products. It doesn’t matter where the reduction occurs, in the design of the product
or in processes in the buyer’s or supplier’s facilities, as long as the activity leads to a real hard cost
reduction for the supplier the data indicates that the supplier is likely to maintain the product’s
quality. In addition, if the supplier perceives that there are real opportunities for realizing an
acceptable return, whatever acceptable may be for the supplier, on buyer business over the longterm, the data indicates the supplier will maintain the product’s quality. It is possible that certain
situations preclude the buying firm from engaging in the strategies above. In such cases,
recognizing the tradeoffs associated with price concession demands might limit buyer’s desire to
engage in price concession demands, or to understand the potential reaction of suppliers. This can
help the buyer to mitigate concerns from supplier reactions through additional oversight or through
different supplier relationship strategies.
In the language of equity theory, the revenue and profit losses realized by the supplier that
result from the supplier price concession given in response to the buyer price reduction pressures
causes the supplier to perceive that an inequitable situation has been created between them and
their customer. To right the inequity, the supplier undertakes three specific product-related actions
– product quality is reduced, as is services and R&D expenditures associated with the product
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whose price has been reduced. The buyer, however, can reduce the negative impacts of the
supplier compensatory actions by being proactive in terms of appropriate organizational justice
approaches to mitigate the effect of the perceived inequity. In anticipation of implementing price
reduction pressures on a supplier the buyer should ensure that good communication exists between
itself and the affected supplier, that an environment of profit opportunity exists for the supplier,
and that the buyer has personnel, and processes and procedures in place that can be used to work
with the supplier to reduce costs associated with the supplier’s product, wherever within the buyer
– supplier system cost reduction opportunities may exist.
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS & FUTURE RESEARCH
This research contributes to previous work in several ways. First, it identifies equity theory
as motivation to understand how suppliers respond to perceived inequities in the form of granting
price concessions to buyers and organizational justice as a potential mechanism for reducing the
negative outcomes of such inequities. The findings address when suppliers engage in either
negative or positive behaviors when faced with buyer-initiated adversarial price reduction
pressures and potential relational inequities. By integrating equity theory, organizational justice,
and buyer-supplier relational dynamics, we present empirical evidence that inequity in the
relationship can lead to compensatory behaviors from the suppliers to address this perceived
inequity. However, this compensatory effect can be reduced by organizational justice through the
application of buyer-supplier relational behaviors of buyer communication, supplier trust in the
buyer, supplier expectations of returns, and buyer cost reduction help. This extends prior research
on price concessions which has explored the conditions through which a supplier would grant a
price concession request (Henke et al., 2009) by connecting it to reductions in supplier output
when price concessions are granted. Understanding how the different dimensions of organizational
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justice can lead to positive supplier outcomes, even in the presence of price concessions, provides
a positive path forward for firms who are facing high pressure to reduce prices.
It’s also worth pointing out that the results from this research serve as a unique corollary
to the research on power dynamics as extant research has explored different power levels inherent
in the relationship (Villena & Craighead, 2016), whereas this study explores the outcomes related
to the application of power, in the form of price concessions granted by suppliers. In other words,
rather than studying the conditions of power/dependency dynamics, which can lead to different
relational outcomes and potential inequity, this manuscript explores the implications for when the
buyer wields power and how suppliers respond to the use of such power in different conditions.
Future research should examine the relationships between power/dependence dynamics,
the application of power, and supplier responses, particularly in terms of inequity and
organizational justice. Research exploring alternative compensatory behaviors could also provide
additional insight into these issues. For example, suppliers could compensate through
opportunistic behavior, which could be closely related to many of these organizational justice
constructs. Additionally, the compensatory actions identified in this manuscript could lead to
opportunistic behavior to cover up such actions. For example, consider the Takata airbag recalls,
which was largely due to the switch from tetrazole to ammonium nitrate to save costs as margins
were getting tighter (Tabuchi, 2014). Takata “routinely manipulated results of air-bag inflator tests”
going as far back as the year 2000 (Trudell & Fisk, 2016:1), hiding the increased risks and
decreased quality of the product. How opportunism might emerge as compensatory actions to
inequity or low organizational justice and also how it could amplify the risks associated with
compensatory action should be investigated.
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Though this study has furthered our understanding of the role that OEM price reduction
pressure plays on service, R&D, and quality responses from the supplier there is more work to do.
Understanding the contextual details regarding the price concessions can yield additional findings
relative to how inequity is perceived in the relationship. Buyer behaviors surrounding the price
concessions can enhance or diminish the perceptions of inequity and thus the supplier’s response.
For example, if the buyer is demanding price concessions from a tier one supplier while at the
same time engaging in direct sourcing with tier two or tier three suppliers, the perception of
inequity could be worse. Also, a limitation of the present study is the single item nature of the
constructs measured in this survey. While extant research has leveraged this approach, future work
should capture a multidimensional approach to the constructs measured herein. Related to this, is
the potential limitation of using a survey instrument for capturing some, potentially, objective
measures of performance. Future research should triangulate “softer” measures of concession
outcomes with more objective (perhaps financial) measures to extend the external validity of the
findings.
This research focused its scope on the automotive industry. Clearly, there exists significant
price pressure in other industries such as aerospace, pharmaceutical and others. Future research
should explore the crossover of these results to other industries so as to extend the external validity
of the results. The present study seeks to address the value of working relations between parties
and the connection that they have in remediating the negative impact of such price pressure. As a
result, there are no financial metrics used in the analysis. Given the increasingly important role
that supply chain finance and the financial flows in a supply chain play in understanding supply
chains (Carnovale, Rogers, & Yeniyurt, 2018; Carter, Rogers, & Choi, 2015), this is a necessary
avenue for future research. Specifically, future research should examine the connection between
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such price pressure and financial performance (i.e. cash-conversion-cycles, ROA, ROI, ROIC,
ROE, etc.). Finally, while we examine the R&D response of the suppliers being pressured, future
research should investigate how such price related pressure impacts the innovation output of the
suppliers in the firm’s network.
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FIGURE 2
Empirical Model
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TABLE 1. Correlations and Descriptive Statistics
Correlations *p<.05

Mean

SD

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1.Price Reduction Given Previous Year

2.8509

2.8316

1

2.Communication

3.0056

1.1202

-0.0213

1

3.Supplier’s Trust

2.8549

1.1471

-0.0317*

0.7076*

1

4.Supplier long term returns

2.8785

0.9627

-0.0323*

0.4868*

0.5729*

1

5.Buyer Cost Reduction Help

2.0799

0.9910

0.0330*

0.4698*

0.4973*

0.3804*

1

6.NPD Involvement

3.1323

1.1474

0.0655*

0.3896*

0.3195*

0.2539*

0.2896*

1

7.Price Pressure

4.0194

0.9680

0.1627*

-0.2203*

-0.2704*

-0.2616*

-0.1190*

0.0053

1

8.OEM Share of Business

23.5963

22.0171

0.1185*

0.0202

0.0479*

0.0152

-0.0195

0.0947*

0.1042*

1

9.Supplier size

18.1902

2.8533

0.0165

0.0124

0.0065

-0.0119

0.0882*

0.0994*

0.0554*

-0.1399*

1

10.Working Experience

20.2156

16.8480

0.0392*

-0.0898*

-0.1191*

-0.0943*

-0.1052*

0.0167

0.1628*

0.1568*

0.1037*
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1

TABLE 2. OLS Estimates of Hypotheses H1a-c to H5a-c
Independent Variables

Dependent: Quality
response
β

Price Reduction Given
Previous Year
Communication
Supplier’s Trust
Supplier Long Term
Returns
Buyer Cost Reduction Help
NPD Involvement
Price Reduction Pressure
OEM Share of Business
Supplier size
Working Experience
Intercept
Fit statistics

-0.0205
0.0124
0.0329
0.1053
0.0642
-0.0014
0.0389
-0.0001
0.0004
-0.0001
2.6266

Dependent: Service
response

Dependent: R&D response

Robust
Std. Error

β

Robust
Std.
Error

β

**

0.0081

-0.0149

0.0091

-0.0205

**

0.0102

***

0.0219
0.0203
0.0203

0.0584
0.0695
0.1674

**
**
***

0.0256
0.0260
0.0237

0.0812
0.0755
0.2261

**
**
***

0.0282
0.0283
0.0259

0.0181
0.0151
0.0175
0.0008
0.0074
0.0010
0.1592

0.0677
0.0226
-0.0485
-0.0005
-0.0249
-0.0005
2.7287

**

0.0224
0.0191
0.0187
0.0010
0.0097
0.0012
0.2083

0.0936
0.0191
-0.0690
0.0004
0.0092
-0.0017
1.7625

***

0.0272
0.0201
0.0231
0.0011
0.0101
0.0014
0.2281

***
***

***

n=1,733 F(25,
1707)=6.334 (p<.001),
R2= .1036

**
**
***

n=1,732 F(25,
1706)=19.93 (p<.001),
R2= .2480

Robust
Std. Error

**

***

n=1,734 F(25,1708)=
29.25, R2= .2993

Note: Significance levels are two tailed. Intercepts, dummy variables for component type, buyer (OEM), and year are
not shown in the table due to space considerations.
**p<.05, ***p<.001
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Table 3: Summary of Hypothesis Support, Theoretical, and Managerial Contribution(s)
Theoretical
Construct

Quality
(a)

Service
(b)

R&D
(c)

Hypothesis
Support

Price
Concessions (-)

ET

-

N.S.

-

2/3
Supported

H2

Buyer
Communication
(+)

INJ

N.S.

+

+

2/3
Supported

H3

Supplier’s
Trust (+)

IPJ

N.S.

+

+

2/3
Supported

H4

Supplier Long
Term Returns
(+)

DJ

+

+

+

3/3
Supported

H5

Buyer Cost
Reduction Help
(+)

PJ

+

+

+

3/3
Supported

Hypothesis

Measurement

H1

Theoretical & Managerial Implication(s)
Unilateral price concessions have a particularly attenuated
and negative effect on the quality levels, and willingness to
continue joint R&D expenditures delivered to the OEM.
Suppliers react to changes in their equity by reducing the
quality and the R&D, both transparent costs that can be
matched to price concessions.
Positive communication between buyer and supplier can
offset the potential negative effects resulting from unilateral
price concessions to both service levels, as well as future
R&D expenditures. Effective informational justice can lead
to more positive supplier responses in terms of relational
performance, though not at the product level.
Fostering trust between parties can offset the potential
negative effects resulting from unilateral price concessions
to both service levels, as well as future R&D expenditures.
Interpersonal justice, reflected in trust, leads to positive
supplier relational performance, though not at a product
level.
The supplier's belief that the relationship will foster long
term returns, even as unilateral price concessions are
demanded, significantly impacts their efforts in quality, and
service levels, as well as future joint R&D expenditures
with the OEM. Fairness in distribution of returns (i.e.,
expectations of long term returns for both parties) leads to a
positive supplier response.
The buyer's demonstrated help with respect to cost
reduction (i.e. sending engineers to help the supplier reduce
component costs), even as unilateral price concessions are
demanded, significantly impacts their efforts in quality, and
service levels, as well as future joint R&D expenditures
with the OEM. Efforts to engage in procedural justice (i.e.,
sharing the burden during price reductions) leads to a
positive supplier response.

(-), (+) = hypothesized relationship with dependent variables, N.S. = Not Significant, ET = Equity Theory, INJ = Informational Justice, IPJ = Interpersonal Justice, DJ =
Distributive Justice, PJ = Procedural Justice
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Appendix: Instrument Details
Variable

Dependent
/
Independent

Instrument Question

Dependent

To compensate for the 200[X]** price reduction
concessions given to the OEM, what phrase in
the above scale best describes the action your
firm is or will be taking during 200[X], in
product quality (excluding actions that might
negatively impact consumer safety)?
To compensate for the 200[X]** price reduction
concessions given to the OEM, what phrase in
the above scale best describes the action your
firm is or will be taking during 200[X], in
services/support (including launch support)
provided to the OEM?
To compensate for the 200[X]** price reduction
concessions given to the OEM, what phrase in
the above scale best describes the action your
firm is or will be taking during 200[X], in
research and development expenditures?

Quality
Response

Service
Response

R&D Response

Price Reduction
Pre. Year

Total 'hard*' price reduction concession
percentage your firm gave the OEM in 200[X]**

Communication

To what extent does the OEM communicate
openly and honestly with your firm?

Supplier’s Trust

Independent

Buyer Cost
Reduction Help

To what extent do you trust the OEM?
Given the OEM's expectations, including cost
and quality, to what extent do you think your
firm will be able to make an acceptable return on
the OEM's business over the long-term?
To what extent does the OEM help your firm
reduce costs?

NPD
Involvement

To what extent does the OEM involve your firm
early enough in its product development process?

Price Reduction
Pressure

To what extent does your firm feel pressure from
the OEM to reduce prices?
What was the approximate share (percent) of
your firm's total 200[X] North American OEM
automotive sales for each of your OEM
customers?
What was your firm's total 200[X] North
American OEM automotive sales in U.S. dollars,
rounded to the nearest $100,000 (e.g.,
25,600,000)?

Supplier Long
Term Returns

OEM Share of
Business

Supplier Size
Working
Experience

Control

Reference(s)

(Henke et al., 2008;
Henke et al., 2009;
Henke Jr,
Parameswaran, &
Pisharodi, 2008; Henke
et al., 2014; Zhang et
al., 2009; Zhang,
Viswanathan, & Henke,
2011)

How many years has your firm been supplying
production goods to the OEM in North America?

*In the instrument, the following is communicated to the respondents: "hard' price reduction refers to a decrease
in purchase order piece price."
**The year to which the instrument makes mention is the year prior to the responses
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